Copyright at a Crossroad: Why Improper Appointment of Copyright Royalty Judges Could Undermine American Copyright Law, and How Congress Can Solve the Problem by Louer, Greg
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 60 
Issue 1 Fall 2010 Article 8 
2010 
Copyright at a Crossroad: Why Improper Appointment of 
Copyright Royalty Judges Could Undermine American Copyright 
Law, and How Congress Can Solve the Problem 
Greg Louer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Greg Louer, Copyright at a Crossroad: Why Improper Appointment of Copyright Royalty Judges Could 
Undermine American Copyright Law, and How Congress Can Solve the Problem, 60 Cath. U. L. Rev. 183 
(2011). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol60/iss1/8 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
COPYRIGHT AT A CROSSROAD: WHY IMPROPER
APPOINTMENT OF COPYRIGHT ROYALTY JUDGES
COULD UNDERMINE AMERICAN COPYRIGHT
LAW, AND HOW CONGRESS CAN SOLVE THE
PROBLEM
Greg Louer+
"[B]illions of dollars and the fates of entire industries can ride on the
Copyright Royalty Board's decisions."1 As Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh's
statement makes clear, the Copyright Royalty Board (Board)'s decisions carry
significant consequences for parties subject to its determinations. 2 Appointed
by the Librarian of Congress (Librarian)3 and housed in the Library of
Congress (Library),4 the Board consists of three copyright royalty judges
tasked with determining reasonable rates and terms for payments under the
compulsory-license provisions of the copyright law.5  Congress created the
judgeships in 20046 to reform an underwhelming royalty-distribution system
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1. SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571 F.3d 1220, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The District of Columbia Circuit highlighted the Copyright Royalty
Board's "substantial discretion" in rate proceedings. Id. (majority opinion).
2. See id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (describing the effect that the Board's decisions may
have on various industries).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2006) ("The Librarian of Congress shall appoint 3 full-time
Copyright Royalty Judges ... after consultation with the Register of Copyrights.").
4. 37 C.F.R. § 301.1 (2009) ("The Copyright Royalty Board is the institutional entity in the
Library of Congress that will house the Copyright Royalty Judges .... ).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 801(a)-(b) (outlining the copyright royalty judges' duties, and authorizing
them "[t]o make determinations and adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of royalty
payments as provided in [the Copyright Act]"). A compulsory license is "a license which the
holder of a copyright in a work must grant to one who uses the work in any of the ways specified
in the Copyright Law." Midge M. Hyman, Note, The Socialization of Copyright: The Increased
Use of Compulsory Licenses, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 107 (1985).
6. Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, sec. 3,
§§ 801-802, 118 Stat. 2341, 2341-46 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-802)
(establishing the qualifications for and the procedures related to the judgeships).
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long criticized by copyright holders and users.7  Yet, Congress's legislative
efforts are already under attack. Two recent challenges question whether the
judges were appointed in violation of the United States Constitution's
Appointments Clause, alleging that Congress impermissibly authorized a
legislative officer to appoint inferior executive officials.8
Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, Congress may vest appointment
authority for inferior officers "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments." 9 The Appointments Clause and the separation-
of-powers principle, however, do not allow a legislative branch officer to
appoint legislative officers who perform executive functions.' 0 Thus, if a court
determines that copyright royalty judges are inferior executive officers-that
is, inferior officers who perform executive functions-subject to the
Librarian's supervision," then their appointments would violate the
Constitution unless the Librarian is a head of department for purposes of the
7. See infra note 83.
8. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69, 75-76 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (describing an appellant's argument that copyright royalty judges are
inferior officers inappropriately appointed under the Appointments Clause, but declining to
resolve the question); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2-3, Live365, Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Bd., 698 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 09-01662 (RBW)) (seeking a
preliminary injunction against the Copyright Royalty Board on the basis that the Librarian
unconstitutionally appoints copyright royalty judges).
9. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Appointments Clause vests the President with the
power to
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, . . . but the Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Id.
10. See id.; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1986) ("The Constitution does not
contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervisions of officers charged with the execution
of the laws it enacts.").
11. In Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, the plaintiff asserted that copyright royalty
judges should be deemed to be principal officers of the United States "who must be appointed by
the President" or, alternatively, be deemed to be inferior officers of the United States who must
be appointed by the President, a head of department, or the courts. Complaint for Declaratory &
Injunctive Relief, supra note 8, at 7, 9. The challenge asserted that copyright royalty judges fail
either test under Article II and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Appointments Clause.
Id at 9.
This Comment focuses on the second prong of the Live365 challenge and does not discuss
commentary regarding the plaintiffs principal-officer assertion. However, significant evidence
suggests that copyright royalty judges may be principal officers, not inferior officers, and
therefore their appointments violate the Appointments Clause. See SoundExchange, Inc. v.
Librarian of Cong., 571 F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(observing that copyright royalty judges resemble principal officers because "they are not
removable at will and their decisions regarding royalty rates apparently are not reversible by the
Librarian of Congress or any other Executive Branch official"). If copyright royalty judges are
determined to be principal officers rather than inferior officers, then "the present means of
appointing Board members is unconstitutional." Id. at 1227.
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Appointments Clause.12 Furthermore, a conclusion that the appointments
violate the Constitution would not only "invalidate the Judges'
determinations," it would also "call into question the status of every registered
American copyright."1 3
Part I of this Comment explores this constitutional problem by providing an
introduction to the separation-of-powers principle used by the Framers in
crafting the Appointments Clause, followed by an evaluation of Supreme Court
jurisprudence interpreting the Clause. Next, Part I assesses inferior federal
courts' evaluations of the Library's role in this country's tripartite government.
The Comment then explores the legislative history of the Board's creation.
Part II applies federal jurisprudence to the Librarian's appointment of
copyright royalty judges and asserts that the Librarian (1) is not a head of
department under the Appointments Clause, and (2) should be deemed a
legislative officer subservient to Congress. As a result, the Librarian cannot
constitutionally appoint copyright royalty judges, and a federal court reaching
the constitutional issue should determine that the Board's authorizing statute is
unconstitutional. However, legislative attention can mend the statutory malady
responsible for the Board's precarious constitutional status; therefore, Part III
recommends that Congress amend title 17 of the United States Code to provide
direct presidential appointment of copyright royalty judges independent of the
legislative branch.
I. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE, FEDERAL COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
CLAUSE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD
A. The Appointments Clause: The Framers Adopt a Mechanism to Promote
Separation ofPowers
The doctrine of separation of powers courses through the U.S. Constitution,
and the Appointments Clause is no exception.14 The Appointments Clause,
infused with the separation-of-powers principle, functions as a structural and
political tool (1) to prevent one branch of the government from aggrandizing
power at the expense of another, and (2) to ensure that the appointment power
remains concentrated in the intended actors.15 These motivating ideals lie at
the foundation of American self-governancel 6 and were considered "a felt
12. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69, 75 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (stating that the Librarian is neither the President nor a court, but
declining to decide whether the Librarian is a head of department).
13. Id. at 76 (reaching this conclusion because the Register of Copyrights is also appointed
by the Librarian).
14. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991).
15. Id.
16. See E. Fulton Brylawski, The Copyright Office: A Constitutional Confrontation, 44 GEO
WASH. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1975) (instructing that separation of powers was conceived by Charles de
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necessity" to promote the Framers' vision of a divided yet coequal
government.17
To achieve that goal, the Appointments Clause vests the President with the
power, "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, . . . [to] appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States."' 8 The Clause also limits the
President's appointment power by granting Congress the power to determine
the appointment of "inferior Officers"19 : their appointments may be vested "in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 20
As a result, the Clause prevents executive-branch officials from claiming sole
control of the appointment process.21 At the same time, the Clause and the
separation-of-powers principle restrict Congress from appointing legislative
officers who perform executive functions.22 The Appointments Clause thus
upholds the Framers' vision by diffusing appointment power among coequal
branches of government and preventing Congress from aggrandizing
governmental control.23
Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, a French philosopher, and appearing throughout the Framers'
writings).
17. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 271 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009)
("The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."). In quoting Montesquieu, James Madison also
reminded readers that "[t]here can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person, or body of magistrates." Id at 272.
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3162-65 (2010) (denying petitioners' Appointments Clause challenge, and determining that
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board members are properly appointed inferior officers
under the appropriate supervision of a principal officer in the form of the Securities and Exchange
Commission); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662-66 (1997) (indicating that an inferior
officer's status depends on (1) whether the inferior officer's work is directed and supervised by a
principal officer appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, (2)
whether that principal officer has the power to reverse decisions made by the inferior officer, and
(3) whether the principal officer can remove the inferior officer); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 671-73 (1988) (finding that inferior officers are those having limited duties, limited
jurisdiction, and a temporary tenure, unlike principal officers, who perform more significant
duties and are subject to removal at will by the President).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2 1. See id.
22. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1986).
23. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976) (per curiam) ("[T]he debates of the
Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the
Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other
two branches."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (discussing the interplay of congressional and presidential powers).
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B. Supreme Court Evaluation ofAppointments Clause Challenges
1. The Significance ofBowsher v. Synar: An Analytic Framework for
Assessing Inferior Officer Challenges Under the Appointments Clause
The separation-of-powers principle prohibits Con ress from entrusting
executive responsibilities to an officer under its control. Moreover, Congress
enjoys no authority to remove executive officers beyond the confines of
impeachment proceedings. 25 As the Court has stated, the power to remove is
powerful leverage over a subordinate's loyalty. 26
In Bowsher v. Synar, the Court applied this doctrine to strike down a
legislative _provision intended to eliminate budget deficits by reducing federal
spending. The offending provision improperly accomplished this goal by
requiring the Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office (GAO),
28
an officer removable only by Congress, to execute targeted budget cuts in a
report the President was mandated to follow.29 Because of this mandate, the
Comptroller was performing executive functions. 30
To establish the Comptroller's subservience to Congress, the Court
highlighted three facts: (1) the Comptroller represented "an instrumentalit of
the United States Government independent of the executive departments," (2)
24. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733-34 (finding that "implement[ing] the legislative mandate
is the very essence of 'execution' of the law," and that Congress may not retain removal authority
over officers vested with such power). The Supreme Court's landmark 1986 ruling illustrated
that the power to remove is a consequence of the power to appoint and extended the Court's
removal doctrine dating back to the decision in Myers v. United States. Id. at 722-23; see Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding that the President enjoys the power to remove
executive officials whom he appoints).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (granting the United States House of Representatives "the
sole Power of Impeachment"); id. art 1, § 3, cl. 5 (granting the United States Senate "the sole
Power to try all Impeachments"); id art. II, § 4 (subjecting "[t]he President, Vice President and
all civil Officers of the United States" to removal by impeachment). Impeachment charges may
rest only on "Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Id.
26. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726.
27. Id. at 717-18, 736 (reviewing Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251, 99 Stat. 1038, 1063-72 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901
(2006))).
28. 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B) (2006). The Comptroller General of GAO is appointed by the
President upon the advice and consent of the Senate and selected from a list of candidates
presented by the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate. Id. § 703(a)(1)-
(2). However, Congress can remove the Comptroller by impeachment or joint resolution upon a
finding that the Comptroller is permanently disabled, inefficient, neglectful, malfeasant, or
involved in a felony indicative of moral turpitude. Id § 703(e)(1)(B).
29. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 718 (stating that the Act required the Comptroller to report to
the President budget-reduction levels necessary to prevent the deficit from exceeding a maximum
amount and required the President to issue "a sequestration" order to execute the reductions).
30. Id. at 733-34.
31. Id. at 730 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 702(a)). According to the Court, Congress created GAO
to review the executive branch's application of appropriated funds in an independent manner. See
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he was viewed by Congress as a legislative officer,32 and (3) he viewed himself
as a member of the legislative branch.33 Therefore, the Comptroller was an
executive officer impermissibly subject to congressional control.34 The
Court's conclusion illustrates that an officer vested with executive authority
and concurrently under congressional control cannot meet the Constitution's
separation-of-powers requirements. The legislation at issue in Bowsher
violated those requirements by allowing Congress to retain inordinate power,
and was therefore struck down by the Court.36
2. Freytag v. Commissioner and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board: A Bright-Line Rule for Evaluating Inferior
Officer Challenges
In Freytag v. Commissioner, the Court articulated a two-part test for
determining "Head of Department" status under the Appointments Clause. 37
Although the term itself is not defined in the Constitution,38 Freytag
established that a head of department leads a government agency that is (1)
part of the executive branch, and (2) a "department." 39
In analyzing the second element to determine a head of department, the
Freytag Court confined the definition of "department" strictly to "executive
divisions like the Cabinet-level departments." The Court's definition relied
on reasoning first established in United States v. Germaine 41-and later
extended by United States v. Mouat42 and Burnap v. United
id. (citing H. Mansfield, THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL: A STUDY IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION 65 (1939)).
32. Id. at 731; see Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 784, § 111,
64 Stat. 832, 835 (providing that GAO is an independent legislative office); Reorganization Act
of 1949, Pub. L. No. 109, § 7, 63 Stat. 203, 205 (same); Reorganization Act of 1945, Pub. L. No.
263, § 7, 59 Stat. 613, 616 (same).
33. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 731 (noting that Comptroller General McCarl once stated,
"Congress ... is . . . the only authority to which there lies an appeal from the decision of this
office," unequivocally asserting the office's independence from the executive branch).
34. Id. at 734; see also id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court that the
Act violated the principle of separation of powers regardless of Congress's removal authority,
because the Comptroller General, as a legislative officer, exercised executive responsibilities).
35. See id at 734 (majority opinion).
36. Id.
37. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 885-86 (1991).
38. Cf U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
39. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 885-86.
40. Id. at 886.
41. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510-1 (1879) (defining the term "department"
as "part or division of the executive government, as the Department of State, or of the Treasury").
42. United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307 (1888) (reaffirming United States v.
Germaine and finding that "heads of the Departments were defined in that opinion to be what are
now called the members of the Cabinet"); see also Katzer v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 294, 296
(Ct. Cl. 1914) (holding that heads of departments "are now called members of the Cabinet");
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States43-that heads of departments are cabinet-level officers.4 The Court's
analysis stems from the principle that cabinet-level executives are "subject to
the exercise of political oversight and share the President's accountability to
the people."45 As a result, the power to appoint inferior officers is limited to
the seiior-most officials still accountable to the ballot.46  Under Freytag's
majority view, expanding the definition beyond cabinet-level agencies would
impermissibly diffuse appointment power within a single government branch
and violate the separation-of-powers principle that informs the Appointments
Clause.47 As the Court found, a strict interpretation of "head of department"
ensures that the term is applied consistently across various constitutional
48provisions.
In applying this test, Freytag held that the chief judge of the United States
Tax Court failed both prongs of the head-of-department test.49 First, Congress
expressly established the Tax Court as an "Article I court," not an executive
agency, to avoid having one executive agency adjudicate the work of another. 50
Second, the Court reasoned that treating the Tax Court as a department and its
chief judge as the "head" would "defy the purpose of the Apvointments
Clause" by placing too much authority outside the executive branch. 1
Scully v. United States, 193 F. 185, 188 (C.C.D. Nev. 1910) ("[T]he Supreme Court has defined
'heads of departments' . . . to be what are now called members of the President's cabinet.");
Surowtiz v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 716, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (reasoning that heads of
departments are limited to members of the President's cabinet); Brooks v. United States, 33 F.
Supp. 68, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (concluding that heads of departments are cabinet members, not
bureau heads).
43. Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) ("[H]ead of Department means ...
the Secretary in charge of a great division of the executive branch of the Government, like the
State, Treasury, and War, who is a member of the Cabinet.").
44. Frevtag, 501 U.S. at 886.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
48. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (concluding that "department" should have the same meaning
in the Appointments Clause and the Opinions Clause). The Opinions Clause, for example,
authorizes the President to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. As the Court reasoned in Germaine, the
Appointments Clause must be read in conjunction with the Opinions Clause because a "principal
officer in the one case is the equivalent of the head of department in the other." United States v.
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879).
49. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 888. However, it is important to note that the Court ultimately
upheld the chiefjudge's authority to appoint inferior officers as a court of law. Id at 892 (finding
that Article I courts, including the Tax Court, that "perform exclusively judicial functions"
conform with the Appointments Clause authorization and do "not significantly expand the
universe of actors eligible to receive the appointment power"); see also Exparte Hennen, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839) (holding that district court judges have the power to appoint clerks).
50. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 887-88 (quoting S. REP. No. 91-552, at 301-03 (1969)).
51. Id.
189
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Yet, Freytag's majority opinion does not represent the final word in
interpreting a "department" for Appointments Clause purposes. In fact, the
concurring opinion in Freytag provides an equally influential foundation for
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a case
in which the Court recently held that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), a multimember executive commission, constitutes a "department" for
purposes of the Appointments Clause.52 Seeking to expand the definition of
"department" beyond the cabinet-level to include "all agencies immediateY
below the President in the organizational structure of the Executive branch,"
Justice Antonin Scalia's concurring opinion in Freytag provided the key legal
support for Free Enterprise Fund's holding that a "freestanding component of
the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such
component[,] . . . constitutes a 'Departmen[t]' for the purposes of the
Appointments Clause."54 However, an officer's "department" cannot merely
reside in the executive branch's hierarchical appointment structure; rather, the
agency must remain independent of countervailing political influence outside
of the executive branch and must not be "subordinate to or contained within
any other such component" of the government. 5
C. Lower Federal Courts Hold that the Librarian of Congress Is an Officer of
the Legislative Branch
Bowsher, Freytag, and Free Enterprise Fund provide the structure for
evaluating Appointments Clause challenges to inferior officer appointments,
but lower court decisions applying statutory provisions to the Library provide
important context. These decisions consistently demonstrate the Librarian's
attachment to the legislative branch and parallel the three factors enumerated in
Bowsher. 56
In Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., for example, the Second
Circuit determined that the Library is "part of the legislative branch itself."57
The court relied on two sections of the Library's enabling statute that
effectively gives Congress control of the Library's budget58 beyond the annual
52. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163-64
(2010).
53. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163 (second alteration in original) (affirming the lower
court's determination that independent agencies, such as the SEC, are departments for purposes of
the Appointments Clause); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537
F.3d 667, 676-78 (D.C. Cir. 2008), af'd in relevant part, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
55. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
57. Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 720 F.2d 733, 736 (2d Cir. 1983) (relying
on the governing statute for the Library), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mills Music, Inc. v.
Snyder, 464 U.S. 153 (1985).
58. The Library's enabling statute requires the Joint Committee of Congress on the Library,
which consists of five members each from the House and Senate, to direct any unexpended
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appropriations process. 59 Informed by Congress's direct reservation of control,
the Second Circuit determined that the Library is part of the legislative branch,
and consequently it is independent of the executive branch.o
Moreover, courts have found that statutes aimed at regulating the executive
branch exempt the Library from their provisions. In Ethnic Employees of the
Library of Congress v. Boorstein, for instance, the District of Columbia Circuit
found the Library exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
because the APA's provisions do not apply to the legislative branch. The
District of Columbia Circuit also relied on this reasoning in Washington Legal
Foundation v. United States Sentencing Commission, a case in which the court
found the APA inapplicable to the Library as a member of the legislative
62branch, and in Judd v. Billington, a case in which the court declined to apply
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act to employees of the Library because that
act's language explicitly limits its scope to cover executive employees.63
balance of the Library of Congress's appropriated funds. 2 U.S.C. § 132a (2006) ("The
unexpended balance of any sums appropriated by Congress for the increase of the general library,
together with such sums as may hereafter be appropriated to the same purpose, shall be laid out
under the direction of the Joint Committee of Congress on the Library."); id. § 132b ("The Joint
Committee of Congress on the Library shall, on and after January 3, 1947, consist of the chairman
and four members of the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate and the chairman
and four members of the Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives.").
59. Harry Fox Agency Inc., 720 F.2d at 736 (citing the Library's enabling statute as support
that the Library is a legislative agency).
60. See id; see also LIBRARY OF CONG., REPORT OF THE 1976 LIBRARIAN'S TASK FORCE
ON GOALS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND PLANNING (1977), reprinted in THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
IN PERSPECTIVE: A VOLUME BASED ON THE REPORTS OF THE 1976 LIBRARIAN'S TASK FORCE
AND ADVISORY GROUP 85, 88 (John Y. Cole ed., 1978) ("In [the] basic sense, the national and
international roles of the Library are inseparable from its most important functions-serving the
library of the United States Congress." (emphasis added)); JeanAne Marie Jiles, Copyright
Protection in the New Millennium: Amending the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to Prevent
Constitutional Challenges, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 443, 455 (2000) (asserting that the Librarian, "as
the head ofa legislative office, . . . is a legislative officer").
61. See Ethnic Emps. of the Library of Cong. v. Boorstein, 751 F.2d 1405, 1416 n.15 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (upholding the district court's dismissal of Title VII claims under the Equal
Opportunity Employment Act of 1972 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies). The
court's reasoning stemmed from the legislative history of the APA; the Senate committee report
defined "agency" to exclude "legislative, judicial, and territorial authorities." S. REP. NO. 79-752,
at 10 (1945); see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006).
62. Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
63. Judd v. Billington, 863 F.2d 103, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that "[t]he Library of
Congress, as part of the legislative branch," is immune to claims under the Rehabilitation Act);
see also Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69, 76 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (refusing to address the Appointments Clause issue without sufficient briefing on the effect
of the District of Columbia Circuit's precedent stating that the Library is not in the executive
branch); Clipper v. Billington, 414 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 n.l (D.D.C. 2006) (concluding that the
plaintiff could not rely upon the Rehabilitation Act in claims against the Library).
19I
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Parallel to the third factor enunciated by Bowsher, Keefe v. Library of
Congress illustrated that the Librarian views himself as a member of the
legislative branch.64  In Keefe, which upheld the Library's rules prohibiting
employees from engaging in partisan political activity, the court described
three actions taken by the Librarian to ensure that Hatch Act restrictions on
executive employees' political activity65 would apply to Library employees.6 6
These actions were necessa 7 because the Hatch Act specifically exempts
legislative branch employees.
Federal case law deeming the Library part of the legislative branch remains
uniformly supported with two exceptions. In 1978, the Fourth Circuit
concluded in Eltra Corporation v. Ringer that the U.S. Copyright Office, and
by extension the Library, was apart of the executive branch properly appointed
by a superior principal officer.6 In support of this conclusion, the court turned
to three Supreme Court decisions69 that upheld the Register of Copyright
(Register)'s interpretation of the Copyright Act.70 According to the court, the
Register's interpretive power is indicative of executive authority, and it relied
on the Supreme Court's tacit acceptance of that proposition to determine that
the Register is an executive officer.
Moreover, Eltra distinguished the Register's appointment from the
appointment of Federal Elections Commission (FEC) members at issue in
Buckley v. Valeo.72 In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that Congress's
appointment of FEC members violated constitutional principles requiring
separation of legislative and executive powers.73  Eltra, on the other hand,
64. Keefe v. Library of Cong., 777 F.2d 1573, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (2006) (prohibiting federal employees from taking "part in political
activity").
66. Keefe, 777 F.2d at 1578-79, 1581.
67. See id at 1575.
68. See Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that it is
"indisputable that the operations of the Office of Copyright are executive").
69. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 567-69 (1973) (upholding a California statute
criminalizing the act of pirating recorded works, and relying upon an interpretation of the
Copyright Office on a similar point of law); Desylva v. Ballenstine, 351 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1956)
(upholding the decision of the Copyright Office to "register renewal claims by children during the
lifetime of an author's widow or widower"); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 211-14 (1954)
(relying upon a rule issued by the Register under authorization provided by the 1909 Act).
70. See Eltra, 579 F.2d at 299.
71. Id.at299-301.
72. Id. at 299-300; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-19 (1976) (per curiam)
(holding that Congress may not vest appointment authority outside of the strictures demanded by
the Appointments Clause).
73. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 118-19. As the Court stated,
If the Legislature wishes the Commission to exercise all of the conferred powers, then
its members are in fact "Officers of the United States" and must be appointed under the
Appointments Clause. But if Congress insists upon retaining the power to appoint, then
the members of the Commission may not discharge those many functions of the
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found Buckley's holding inapplicable to the Register because the President
appoints the Librarian, who in turn appoints the Register.74 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the Appointments Clause was respected because the Librarian
is an "officer of the United States," who oversees and appoints inferior officers
*75to an executive agency.
Although Eltra represents the only federal holding to address the Register's
appointment directly, no subsequent decision reaching the Library's status on
the meritS76 cites to the Fourth Circuit with approval on this point. 77 In fact,
one district court in the Third Circuit rejected Eltra's holding entirely.78  In
United States v. Brooks, the court deemed the Copyright Office, as part of the
Library, a member of the legislative branch.79 Eltra found the Register and
Librarian's codification and appropriation under the legislative branch
irrelevant,so but Brooks criticized the Eltra analysis as "unpersuasive" and
rejected the Fourth Circuit's conclusion.
D. Creation of the Copyright Royalty Board
1. Congress Adopted the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act to
Reform a Broken Process
Congress established the Copyright Royalty Board by passing the
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 (2004 Act). 8 2
The 2004 Act replaced a patchwork of generally unpopular Copyright
Commission which can be performed only by "Officers of the United States" as that
term must be construed within the doctrine of separation of powers.
Id
74. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 300.
75. Id. at 300-01. It must be noted that Buckley's holding relied on United States v.
Germaine, a case in which the Court determined that executive officers below the cabinet level
may not appoint inferior officers. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26. The Eltra court, however,
ignored the fact that the Librarian is not a cabinet-level official, and therefore may not appoint
inferior officers. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 300-01.
76. But see Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 698 F. Supp. 2d 25, 43 (D.D.C. 2010)
(citing Eltra with approval and finding, in denying the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction, that "even though the Library is codified under Title II and is a free standing entity
that operates independently from the Executive Branch in conducting its daily operations, the
Librarian appears to nonetheless qualify as a Head of Department").
77. See United States v. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. 830, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
78. Id. at 833-34.
79. Id.
80. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 301.
81. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. at 833.
82. -Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat.
2341 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-805 (2006)).
83. See Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) Structure and Process: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 49-50 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Hearing] (statement of Rep. Howard L.
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Arbitration Royalty Panels (CARPs) and substituted the Board in their
place. 84
To fulfill the Board's mission, Congress required the Librarian to appoint
three copyright royalty judges tasked with making "determinations and
adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of royalty payments."85 The Board's
creation followed a lengthy congressional investigation into the failings of the
CARP process and reflected collaboration between copyright holders and
users.86 However, in creating the copyright royalty judgeships, Congress failed
to heed the lessons of the past. As unpopular as the CARPs may have been,
Congress avoided a thorough analysis of the constitutional issue now plaguing
the copyright royalty judges.87
Berman) (noting the unpopularity of the CARP system); H.R. REP. No. 108-408, at 18, 99-100
(2004) (discussing dissatisfaction with the CARP process from both copyright holder and user
communities, each of which claimed that (1) CARP decisions were "unpredictable and
inconsistent," (2) CARP arbitrators lacked sufficient experience and expertise, (3) the CARP
process was "unnecessarily expensive," and (4) many CARP claims were frivolous).
84. See sec. 3, § 801, 118 Stat. at 2341-45. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of
1993 amended the Copyright Act of 1976 by dismantling the Copyright Tribunal in an effort to
reform the perceived inefficiency and expense of the Tribunal. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.27[B] (2010); see Copyright Royalty Tribunal
Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1).
86. See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1417
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 53-54, 57, 63, 65, 69, 73-76 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Hearing]
(demonstrating widespread support for Congress's legislative effort to amend the CARP process
and establish a new compulsory license review board, including statements from the National
Music Publishers' Association; the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and
Canada; the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers and Broadcast Music, Inc.;
the National Association of Broadcasters; SESAC, Inc.; the American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists; and the Intercollegiate Broadcasting System).
87. See, e.g., id The hearing record from 2003 is replete with examples of CARP failures,
yet displays little recognition of the potential constitutional issues raised later by challengers in
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board and Live365, Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Board. In fact, the legislative history of the 2004 Act includes only a brief
justification for vesting the Librarian with the power to appoint copyright royalty judges. See
H.R. REP. No. 108-408, at 27 (2004). The only other reference to potential constitutional issues
was raised in a letter to the House Committee on the Judiciary, submitted by Intercollegiate
Broadcasting, Inc.:
You will recall that Congress attempted to resolve the Appointments Clause problem
by making the Librarian a Presidential appointee. As such, he is subject to the
President's constitutional duty to take care that such policies be implemented and to a
duty to implement the President's executive orders. If, consistent with the Librarian's
litigating position, he were considered a Congressional officer in respect of copyright
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2. Congress Departs from the Constitutional Concerns of the Past
Congress's failure to review the Appointments Clause issues thoroughly
before passing the 2004 Act may stem from the twenty-seven year gap
between the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Tribunal)'s creation in 1976 and its
replacement by the copyright royalty judges in 2004.88 Unlike the deliberative
process leading up to the 2004 Act, Congress devoted significant attention to
potential separation-of-powers concerns raised before the Tribunal's creation.
Professor Fulton E. Brylawski sounded the initial alarm in a 1975 article90
criticizing then-pending legislation seeking to authorize the Register of
Copyrights to appoint Tribunal members:
One provision of the revision bill would create within the Copyright
Office a Copyright Royalty Tribunal that would have the authority
to decide disputes with respect to the distribution of royalties and to
establish new royalty rates or cable TV and phonograph records, and
possibly for performances of sound recordings.
. . . The ratemaking function of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal
appears, therefore, to constitute a clearly unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power that only compounds the serious constitutional
infirmities of the proposed copyright law.91
On June 5, 1975, Professor Brylawski testified before the House Judiciary
Committee during consideration of the 1976 Copyright Act amendments and
recommended that Congress instead establish the Tribunal as an independent
executive agency appointed by the President.92 The ultimate resolution of
Professor Brylawski's presentation and the committee's response is reflected in
88. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 92-97.
90. See Brylawski, supra note 16, at 5, 36-40 (asserting that pending legislation vested
unconstitutional executive and legislative power in Tribunal members). In a footnote, Brylawski
noted that his attack on the constitutional status of the Copyright Office was the first of its kind:
"The constitutionality of the present administration of the Copyright Office or its future
administration under the revision bill is taken for granted perhaps because no constitutional
assault has been mounted." Id at 37 n. 180.
91. Id. at 37-38, 40.
92. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 465 (1975)
(statement of E. Fulton Brylawski). The hearing transcript following Professor Brylawski's
presentation suggests that committee members absorbed the weight of his charges. A brief
colloquy among committee members, led by subcommittee chairman Representative Danielson,
is illustrative: "I just want to say thank you. I had not thought about that constitutional problem at
all, for which I can only sit here and blush and say thank you very much." Id. at 466. He was
followed by Representative Edward W. Pattison: "I feel the same way. No questions." Id
Representative Danielson then concluded, "I think you may have a point." Id.
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both the legislative outcome and the accompanying committee report.93 The
House applied his reasoning and provided direct presidential appointment of
Tribunal members. 94 The House also required the Tribunal to be established as
an independent authority outside the legislative branch. 5  The committee's
respect for the underlying separation-of-powers principles informing the
Appointments Clause, in addition to Professor Brylawski's cogent analysis,
were subsequently included in the House amendments96 and later codified as
law.97
II. APPOINTMENT OF COPYRIGHT ROYALTY JUDGES: A FAILURE TO SATISFY
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Assuming a court determines that copyright royalty judges are inferior
executive officers,98 the appropriateness of their appointments will turn on
whether the Librarian is deemed a "head of a department within the meaning of
the Appointments Clause." 99 Supreme Court and lower federal court precedent
dictate that the statute providing for the appointment of copyright royalty
judges fails the relevant Appointments Clause test.
A. Appointment of Copyright Royalty Judges Fails the Supreme Court's Test
1. According to Freytag and Free Enterprise Fund, the Librarian Is Not a
Head ofDepartment and Cannot Appoint Inferior Executive Officers
Although Freytag's majority opinion did not "identify the precise
characteristics of 'Cabinet-like' departments,"'0o the Court established that
cabinet-level officials are limited to appointees that share the President's
political accountability to the electorate. This limiting construction reflects
93. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 174 (1976) (providing independence for copyright
royalty commissioners as a direct result of constitutional concerns).
94. Id. ("Due to constitutional concern over the provision of the Senate bill that the Register
of Copyrights, an employee of the Legislative Branch, appoint the members of the Tribunal, the
Committee adopted an amendment providing for direct appointment of three individuals by the
President.").
95. Id.
96. See 122 CONG. REc. 34,226 (1976) (statement of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier)
(adopting changes raised by scholars and House members to avoid a potential constitutional
problem).
97. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(a), 802(a) (2000), repealed by Copyright Royalty and Distribution Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341.
98. See supra note 11.
99. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69, 76 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
100. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 676-78 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), aff'd in relevant part, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (interpreting the rule from Freytag, and
holding that heads of departments can include multimember independent agencies).
101. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 886 (1991).
[Vol. 60:183196
2010] Copyright at a Crossroad: The Improper Appointment ofJudges
the Framers' intent to confine the appointment power to senior executive
officials1 0 2 and to place a heavy emlhasis on the political accountability shared
by the President and his appointees.
The Librarian, like the chief judge of the U.S. Tax Court in Freytag, is not
subject to the level of electoral oversight demanded by the Court. The
Librarian is not a member of the President's cabinetl 04 and is not regularly
subject to the same political oversight common of high-ranking executive
officers. 05  Nor do the Librarian's responsibilities rise to the level of those
normally handled by cabinet members and other department heads.106 Thus,
the Librarian's appointment power falls short of the constitutional standard
under Freytag's majority analysis.
A similar result is commanded by Justice Scalia's more expansive analysis
articulated in Freytag's concurring opinion, and the clarification offered by
Free Enterprise Fund nineteen years later.107 This assertion undercuts a
principal argument relied upon by the federal government in Intercollegiate
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board and Live365, Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Board, os in addition to the district court's preliminary
102. Id. at 885.
103. See id at 886 (instructing that heads of departments are subject to the President's
political oversight).
104. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 230 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "cabinet" as "compris[ing]
the heads of the 15 executive departments" and listing them). Although other officials, including
the United States ambassador to the United Nations and the director of the Office of Management
and Budget, are accorded cabinet rank, the Librarian is not among them. Id.
105. Much to the contrary, the current Librarian retains a long-standing appointment dating
to 1987, a period of time unheard of for cabinet-level officials, and follows predecessors who
served twelve and twenty years, respectively. See Office of the Librarian: About the Librarian of
Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/about/librarianoffice/about.html (last
updated May 1, 2008) ("James Hadley Billington was sworn in as the Librarian of Congress on
September 14, 1987. He is the 13th person to hold the position since the Library was established
in 1800."); see also Previous Librarians of Congress: Daniel J. Boorstin, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/about/librarianoffice/boorstin.html (last updated May 5, 2008)
(illustrating that the twelfth Librarian served for twelve years); Previous Librarians of Congress:
Lawrence Quincy Mumford, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/about/librarianoffice/
mumford.html (last updated May 5, 2008) (showing that the eleventh Librarian served for twenty
years).
106. See Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (holding that heads of
departments are limited to members of the President's cabinet); United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S.
303, 307 (1888) (discussing Germaine's holding with approval); United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. 508, 511 (1879) (indicating that heads of departments are limited to high-ranking executive
officials like the Predident's cabinet members); infra note 116 (discussing the Librarian's service
to Congress).
107. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163-64
(2010); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 915-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
108. See Supplemental Brief for the Copyright Royalty Board, at 8, Intercollegiate Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1123) (contending that
a "principal agency like the Library" must be held to be a "Department" under the Appointments
Clause); see also Memorandum of Points and Authorities 1) in Support of Defendants' Motion to
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finding in Live365,109 and warrants scrutiny beyond Freytag's majority holding
as a result.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia concluded that heads of departments
include officers outside the President's cabinet."o Justice Scalia rested his
conclusion on the administrative reality that many important executive
departments-the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), for
example-are not headed by cabinet members."' However, to strip those
heads of the ability to appoint inferior officers would create substantial
inefficiencies because they would have to rely on the President or his cabinet
to staff their departments. 1 12 As Free Enterprise Fund makes clear, however,
the head of an executive department may not wield such extraordinary power
without clear executive independence free from subservience to the legislative
branch.1 13
Consequently, the Court's analysis in Free Enterprise Fund precludes the
Librarian from appointing inferior executive officers by virtue of being a head
of department.' 14  Rather than filling a major policy-making role in the
President's cabinet or in an independent executive agency,115 the Librarian's
foremost mission is to serve Congress and the legislative branch." 6 Although
Dismiss and 2) in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, at 27, Live365,
Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 698 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:09-01662 (RBW))
(asserting that it would be implausible to hold that the Library of Congress is not a "department"
under the Appointments Clause).
109. See Live365, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 2d at 40-43 (determining that the plaintiffs could not
prove that there was a substantial likelihood, for purposes of obtaining a preliminary injunction,
that their inferior officer challenge under the Appointments Clause would succeed on the merits
at trial). A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy," and a plaintiff must meet a high
burden to be granted one. Id. at 34-35. The court must consider whether "there is a particularly
strong likelihood of success on the merits." Id The burden of proof is higher than at a trial
following discovery, and it requires the plaintiff to make "a clear showing" to carry the burden of
persuasion. Id. at 34.
110. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 919-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Id (reasoning that expanding "Departments" to include independent executive agencies
"is the only construction that makes sense of Article 11, § 2's sharp distinction between principal
officers and inferior officers"); see also Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163-64 (holding that
multimember boards may be heads of departments).
112. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162-64 (describing the importance of executive control
over department heads).
114. See id. at 3162-64; Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
115. The District of Columbia Circuit recently held that an agency enjoys "Cabinet-like"
status when it wields "executive authority over a major aspect of government policy" and its
principal officers are appointed by the President. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff'd in relevant part, 130 S. Ct. 3138
(2010).
116. See About the Library, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/about/ (last updated
Oct. 6, 2009) ("The Library's mission is to make its resources available and useful to the
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appointees such as the Register of Copyrights 17 and copyright royalty
judges'18 perform duties typical of executive agencies, the executive duties
performed by those inferior officers cannot transform the Librarian into the
head of an executive department.1 19
This distinction is missing from Live365, Inc., a case in which the court
determined that the Librarian appeared to be "a Head of Department with
executive authority to appoint inferior officers" "even though the Library . . . is
a free standing entity that operates independently of the Executive branch." 20
Free Enterprise Fund requires the opposite conclusion, however, and
conclusively holds a head of department may only reside in the executive
branch, and may not "be subordinate to or contained within any other
component of the government."l21 Consequently, courts cannot rely on
Live365, Inc. as controlling precedent, and the Librarian should be prohibited
from appointing inferior officers.
2. The Library of Congress Is Not an Executive Agency
Justice Scalia's interpretation of heads of departments and the Free
Enterprise Fund decision provides a common thread with the second element
of Freytag's majority test. After all, the Librarian, although appointed by the
President, 22 is a statutory agent of Congress first and provides services
specifically for Congress. The Congressional Research Service (CRS), a
subdivision of the Library solely devoted to aiding Congress in fulfilling its
mission,124 is illustrative. CRS represents the Library's single largest budget
item outside salaries and expenses,' 25 and it is directed by a chief officer
Congress and the American people and to sustain and preserve a universal collection of
knowledge and creativity for future generations."). In fact, the Librarian's most immediate
service to the President appears limited to providing administrative services. See An Act
Concerning the Library for the Use of Both Houses of Congress, ch. 2, § 4, 2 Stat. 129 (Jan. 26,
1802) (authorizing the President and Vice President to borrow books); see also 2 U.S.C. § 137c
(2006) (authorizing the judges of the District of Columbia Circuit to borrow books); id. § 179p
(directing the Library to perform archival and preservation services for the government).
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2006) (authorizing the Register of Copyrights to administer
copyright law as director of the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress).
118. Id § 801(b) (2006) (assigning the copyright royalty judges' administrative functions).
119. See United States v. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. 830, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that the
Copyright Office's performance of "administrative functions and duties" is insufficient for
executive branch status).
120. Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 698 F. Supp. 2d 25, 43 (D.D.C. 2010).
121. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010).
122. 2 U.S.C. § 136 (2006).
123. See id. § 131 (codifying the Library as an office within "The Congress"); see also id
§§ 166(a)-(b) (authorizing the establishment of the Congressional Research Service and requiring
the Librarian to assist the Congressional Research Service as a resource for Congress).
124. Id § 166(b)(1).
125. The agency employs 705 full-time staff and has a budget of $102,344,000, representing
eighteen percent of the Library's total budget for fiscal year 2008. See LIBRARY OF CONG.,
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appointed by the Librarian after consultation with the Joint Committee of
Congress on the Library;2 an entity entirely comprised by members of
Congress that exercises oversight over the Library's budget and operation.' 27
The Librarian's relationship to Congress is therefore inextricably linked to
the legislative branch and its purpose, and cannot at the same time be
considered executive. 12 A contrary finding would directly offend the Supreme
Court's proposition that Congress, under the Appointments Clause, enjoys no
right to vest in legislative officers the power to appoint officers that perform
executive functions.129
B. Lower Courts Indicate that the Librarian Is Prohibited from Appointing
Inferior Executive Officers
Bowsher suggested that if the Librarian (1) is found to be an officer
independent of the executive departments, (2) is viewed by Congress as an
officer of the legislative branch, and (3) views himself as a member of the
legislative branch, he should be determined a legislative officer subservient to
Congress who cannot appoint inferior executive officers.' 30 This concept is
supported by applying Bowsher's analytic framework to other court decisions,
including Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., Ethnic Employees of the
Library of Congress v. Boorstein, and Keeffe v. Library of Congress.
Together, they illustrate that the Librarian is a legislative officer under
Bowsher and cast a shadow over copyright royalty judges' constitutional status
in the process.
FISCAL 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 1, 9 (2009), available at http://www.loc.
gov/about/reports/budget/fy2009.pdf.
126. 2 U.S.C. § 166(c)(1).
127. See supra note 59.
128. But see Supplemental Brief for the Copyright Royalty Board, supra note 108, at 9
(asserting that the Library's legislative codification is merely a statutory label). In making this
argument, the government relied on Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. for the
proposition that the Constitution, and not Congress, dictates an agency's status within the federal
government. Id. at 12; see Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392-94 (1995).
This reliance is both misplaced and potentially counterproductive to the government's argument.
In Lebron, the Court rejected Amtrak's attempt to escape First Amendment liability by relying on
the organization's originating statute establishing Amtrak as a non-government entity not subject
to the First Amendment. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392-94. The First Amendment rights of American
citizens are not at issue in a challenge of the Board's constitutional status, so reliance upon
Lebron should not control.
129. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 57-67. Although this body of case law, standing
alone, provides strong evidence of the Librarian's status, when applied to Bowsher's reasoning,
each holding provides a seamless link to the Supreme Court's Appointments Clause teachings.
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Harry Fox Agency, Inc. illustrated the Library's status as an independent
legislative agency outside of the executive branch.132 The court found that the
Library is "part of the legislative branch itself' and relied on the Library's
enabling statute for support.133 Citation to the Library's enabling statute is
critical, not coincidental, because the statutory framework provides members
of Congress with direct control over the Library's budget beyond mere
appropriations.134 Retaining budget authority over the management of an
agency indicates control beyond the appropriations process to which every
federal agency is subject.'3 5 A contrary interpretation of the Library's status
within the legislative branch would therefore violate the separation of
136powers.
Further, federal decisions derived from Ethnic Employees of the Library of
Congress v. Boorsteinl37 reflect Congress's long-standing view that the Library
is a legislative institution.13 8 Congress's opinion is manifest in light of the
Administrative Procedure Act,'39 Rehabilitative Act,140 and Hatch Act,141 each
of which, by its terms, does not apply to members of the legislative branch.
Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, the Librarian's own actions
consistently illustrate his identity as a legislative officer. Keeffe supports this
notion by first concluding that "the Library of Congress is a congressional
132. Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 720 F.2d 733, 736 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985).
133. Id.
134. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 132a-132b (2006) (requiring the Joint Committee of Congress on the
Library to direct the balance of any unexpended funds from congressional appropriations).
135. Cf Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986).
136. Id; cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-59 (1983) (establishing that Congress cannot
delegate authority without following the procedures of Article I, which the Framers designed to
maintain the separation of powers). The teachings of the Framers informed Chadha, as indicated
by the citation to Federalist No. 73 where Alexander Hamilton wrote:
If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the
rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of
themselves teach us that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but ought
to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defence.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton)).
137. Ethnic Emps. of the Library of Cong. v. Boorstein, 751 F.2d 1405, 1416 n.15 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (determining that the APA does not apply to the Library).
138. Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(adopting the Ethnic Employees holding and finding the Library exempt from the APA because
the Act does not apply to the legislative branch).
139. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006) (excluding Congress from the definition of "agency").
140. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (2006) (limiting the statute's applicability to agencies within the
executive branch).
141. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (2006) (limiting the statute's applicability to executive branch
employees); Keeffe v. Library of Cong., 777 F.2d 1573, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applying Library
regulations designed to replicate the Hatch Act's regulation of political activity on Library
employees).
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agency" exempt from the Hatch Act.14 2  Second, the decision upholds the
Librarian's self-imposed restrictions modeled on the Hatch Act because Hatch
Act restrictions apply only to executive employees. 43 The Librarian
"recognized that the Hatch Act did not cover Library employees,"1 44 and on
two occasions issued general orders aligning the Hatch Act's prescripts
specifically to cover legislative employees otherwise exempt from the Act.14 5
When combined with the Librarian's own mission statement asserting his
subservience to Congress,146 the Librarian views himself as a member of the
legislative branch.
C. Eltra Cannot Withstand Scrutiny Under Supreme Court Reasoning in
Freytag or Bowsher
Federal case law evaluating the Library's status provides compelling
evidence illustrating Congress's control of the Library in the face of Bowsher's
analytical framework. Regardless, a successful challenge to the copyright
royalty judges' appointments must still overcome the Fourth Circuit's holding
in Eltra. This decision affirmed the Librarian's ability to appoint the Register
of Copyrights and remains the only federal holding to address the Librarian's
appointment power.147
Reliance on Eltra is nevertheless a dubious proposition for three reasons.
First, the 1978 decision failed to analyze the Register's appointment under the
bright-line rule established in 1991 by Freytag and previously articulated in the
case law following Germaine.148 This could be overlooked because Eltra was
decided thirteen years before Freytag.149 However, the Eltra court quoted a
long passage from Buckley that cited directly to Germaine, and the court even
referred to Germaine in the text of its opinion without analyzing the Court's
treatment of the constitutional issue. 50 The case law influencing Freytag's
holding15' was squarely before the Eltra court in 1978. That Eltra failed to
142. Keeffe, 777 F.2d at 1574, 1578.
143. See id. at 1578, 1583.
144. Id at 1578.
145. See LIBRARY OF CONG., OFFICE OF THE LIBRARIAN, GEN. ORDER NO. 1371 (June 29,
1948); LIBRARIAN OF CONG., OFFICE OF THE LIBRARIAN, GEN. ORDER No. 1164 (Nov. 6, 1942).
146. See About the Library, The Mission of the Library of Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/about/mission.html (last updated May 1, 2008) (stating that the "Library's
mission is to make its resources available and useful to the Congress").
147. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 41-44.
149. Compare Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 868 (1991), with Eltra v. Ringer, 579 F.2d
294, 294 (4th Cir. 1978).
150. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 300 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1976) (per
curiam)).
151. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (relying on Germaine and holding that "department" refers
only to cabinet-level officers); see also Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920)
(relying on Germaine and determining that the "term head of a Department means . . . the
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account for Germaine, given its importance and positive treatment by
subsequent Supreme Court cases, renders Eltra's holding questionable at best.
Putting this issue aside, the Eltra court's analysis appears shallow on its
own. The Fourth Circuit relied on an inferential leap from three Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the Register's application of the Copyright Act of
1909.152 In holding that the Register was validly appointed under
Appointments Clause requirements, the court reasoned:
[I]t seems incredible that, if there were a constitutional infirmity in
the 1909 Act, it would have so long escaped notice by either the
Supreme Court or the bar or that the Supreme Court would have
given implicit authorization in the three decisions. . . for the exercise
by the Register of the power to issue rules and regulations, as
provided in the Act.15 3
This inferential chain requires that an Appointments Clause challenge be
read into the three Supreme Court decisions where the Register's appointment
simply was not at issue. 154 According to this logic, Supreme Court deference
must then require consideration of a constitutional challenge not before the
bench.
But this logical inference is simply incorrect. Although courts sometimes
offer commentary concerning important issues not before the bench,"'5 5 they
rarely consider an issue not raised by a party on appeal. 156 In fact, the Supreme
Court's own rule provides that the Court will not entertain an issue not "fairly
comprised" in the petition for certiorari.157 Eltra's holding assumes that the
Supreme Court would violate basic tenants of judicial restraint and should
therefore be considered suspect.
Finally, no subsequent federal decision positively cites to the conclusion
reached in Eltra, with the exception of the court's flawed analysis in Live365,
Inc., yet one district court in the Third Circuit explicitly rejected it in United
Secretary in charge of a great division of the executive branch of the Government, like the State,
Treasury, and War, who is a member of the Cabinet"); United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307
(1888) (approving of Germaine and finding that heads of departments are cabinet members).
152. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
153. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 299-300.
154. See supra note 69.
155. See, e.g., SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571 F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (evaluating the constitutional uncertainty of the Board,
unprompted by either party on appeal).
156. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 443 (1984) ("[W]hen reviewing a
judgment of a federal court, we have jurisdiction to consider an issue not raised below, but we are
generally reluctant to do so."); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2 (1970)
("Where issues are neither raised before nor considered by the Court of Appeals, this Court will
not ordinarily consider them."); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 362 n.16 (1958)
(referencing the Court's rule prohibiting the Court from reviewing issues not in the petition for
certiorari).
157. SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(a).
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States v. Brooks. ss According to Brooks, "the Library of Congress is clearly a
part of Congress, and therefore part of the legislative branch of
government."' Brooks appropriately questioned Eltra's methodology that
equated performance of executive duties with membership in the executive
branch. As the court held in Brooks, "[a]cting similarly to an executive
agency is not the same as being part of the executive branch."' 6 Actual
affiliation with the executive branch is crucial for Appointments Clause
analysis.'
In light of the Brooks rebuke, the dubious reasoning applied by Eltra and the
Fourth Circuit's failure to apply long-standing Supreme Court precedent for
analyzing the Register's appointment, Eltra cannot be relied on as valid law
supporting the Librarian's status as an executive officer. Eltra's holding, in
turn, cannot be relied on to support the copyright royalty judges' constitutional
status.
Ill. SOLUTION TO THE COPYRIGHT CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT AND
INDEPENDENCE FROM THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Significant consequences may impact both copyright holders and users if a
court holds that copyright royalty judges are impermissibly appointed. The
Librarian not only appoints copyright royalty judges, he also appoints the
Register of Copyrights who supervises administration of U.S. copyright law.163
Thus, a successful challenge could "call into question the status of every
registered American copyright" in addition to invalidating the copyright
royalty judges' determinations.164
Either consequence needlessly threatens stakeholder industries reliant on
stable copyright law. However, Congress can avoid unwelcome judicial
intervention by curing the constitutional infirmities in the Board's current
appointment structure. Congress should amend the Copyright Act to (1)
provide the President direct authority to appoint copyright royalty judges and
remove the Board from the legislative branch, and (2) retroactively affirm
decisions under the current process via the "de facto officer" doctrine.
158. See Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 698 F. Supp. 2d 25, 43 (D.D.C. 2010);
United States v. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. 830, 833-34 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
159. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. at 833.
160. See id
161. Id. at 834.
162. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 885-86 (1991) (holding that a head of
department must be in the executive branch); Brooks, 945 F. Supp. at 834 ("The mere fact the
Copyright Office is required to perform 'administrative functions and duties' under the Copyright
Act is not enough to make the Copyright Office a component of the executive branch." (citation
omitted)).
163. 17 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 801(a) (2006).
164. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69, 76 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
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A. Avoiding Confrontation with the Appointments Clause: The Importance of
Presidential Appointment
Most importantly, this proposal eliminates confrontation with the
Appointments Clause by providing copyright royalty judges direct presidential
appointment. The Appointments Clause expressly vests authority in the
President to appoint inferior officers.165 Thus, if appointed by the President,
copyright royalty judges would unambiguously be subservient to the President
as the Constitution demands. The cloud of constitutional uncertainty currently
surrounding every Board decision would dissipate, and the Board's venerated
service would continue free of unnecessary litigation.' 66
This proposal is far from revolutionary. Instead the legislative
recommendation revives the appointment structure of the tribunal as conceived
by the House of Representatives during consideration of the Copyright Law
Amendments of 1976.167 In this way, the recommendation adheres to the
scholarship and constitutional consideration first applied by Congress more
than thirty years ago.
Little deliberation of the constitutionality of the copyright royalty judges'
appointments occurred leading up to the Copyright Royalty and Distribution
Reform Act of 2004. 169 This lack of consideration is at least partially
responsible for the challenge to the Board's appointment structure in
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. and Live365, Inc.170 Nevertheless,
Congress has an opportunity to correct its drafting error before a federal court
ultimately intervenes. Failure to do so may lead to repercussions that are not in
the interest of copyright owners and users.
B. Congress Should Act Before Federal Courts Intervene and Look to Recent
Patent Law Amendments for Support
Congressional preemption of Appointments Clause litigation is not without
precedent. Most recently, Congress eliminated a similar constitutional
challenge from impacting the patent-law structure by amending the
165. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
166. See 2003 Hearing, supra note 86, at 2 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith) (describing the
benefits of a government-supervised copyright royalty panel, which "distributes billions of dollars
among the participants in a fair and even-handed manner" and "helps copyright content owners
and users in the digital age").
167. See 17 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2000), repealed by Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341.
168. See supra Part I.D.2.
169. See supra note 87.
170. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir.
2009); Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 698 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28 (D.D.C. 2010).
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appointment process for administrative patent judges (APJs) in 2008.171 The
action prevented considerable uncertainty in the patent-holder and user
communities,172 and ultimately presents a model Congress can and should
follow with respect to the Copyright Royalty Board.
Prior to 1999, the Department of Commerce appointed APJs to review
adverse decisions of patent examiners as part of the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interference (BPAI). 17 3  Congress amended this structure in 1999 by
providing the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) authority to
appoint APJs. 174
The constitutional validity of this decision remained unchallenged until
2007,175 when Professor John F. Duffy published an article asserting that APJs
were "almost certainly" appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause. 176
Much like in 1975, when Professor Brylawski raised similar criticism
regarding copyright tribunal members' potential appointment,' 77 Professor
Duffy's article prompted questions in the patent-bar community, and litigation
soon followed.
Congress noticed as well and quickly took matters into its own hands before
federal courts could resolve the constitutional issue.179 In less than three
weeks, and with little committee consideration, Congress passed and the
President signed amendments providing the Secretary of Commerce authority
to appoint APJs.1so
171. See Act of Aug. 12, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-313, § 1(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3014, 3014
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6 (Supp. 11 2009)) (providing the Secretary of Commerce authority to
appoint administrative patent judges).
172. See Adam Liptak, In One Flaw, Questions on Validity of46 Judges, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2008, at Al8 (discussing the impact of the flaw on the patent court's decisions).
173. James G. Gatto, Terri Cunningham & Hean Koo, Illegal Judicial Appointments?
Constitutional Attacks on Patent and Copyright Decisions, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Oct.
2008, at 22, 22 (discussing legal issues pertaining to constitutional attacks on administrative
patent judge appointments).
174. Act ofNov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 1000(a)(9), 4717, 133 Stat 1501, 1535-
36, 1501A-580 to -581 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2006)).
175. See Gatto et al., supra note 173, at 22.
176. John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 2007 PATENTLY-O
PAT. L.J. 21, 21, http://www.patentlyo.com/lawjoumaUfiles/Duffy/BPAl.pdf.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
178. See, e.g., In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373, 1377-80 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (refusing to entertain the
appellant's argument based on Professor Duffy's work because the party failed to raise the issue
at the administrative level); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Translogic Tech. v. Dudas,
No. 07-1303 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2008) (petitioning the Supreme Court to hear arguments on the
company's Appointments Clause claim).
179. See Act of Aug. 12, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-313, § l(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3014, 3014
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6 (Supp. 11 2009)).
180. The legislation passed the Senate on July 22, 2008. See CONG. REc. S7079 (daily ed.
July 22, 2008). The House received the bill and passed the legislation unanimously on July 31,
2008. See CONG. REC. H7707 (daily ed. July 31, 2008). The President then signed the bill on
August 12, 2008. See 122 Stat. at 3014-15.
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Yet the amendments did not stop there. Recognizing the threat that potential
litigation might pose to the BPAI decisions between 1999 and 2008, the
legislation also conferred retroactive validity 8 1 upon the PTO director's prior
appointments under the "de facto officer" doctrine.' 82 That doctrine allows
Congress to confer retroactive validity upon administrative decisions rendered
by officers previously appointed in an inappropriate manner.183 Thus, with one
swift legislative stroke, Congress eliminated a constitutional threat to the
patent appeals system by affirming both the prior appointments and the acts of
the appointees.184
Congress's decision to engage the constitutional issue following Professor
Duffy's publication, but before potential court intervention, provides a
successful model to be applied toward copyright royalty judges. By
intervening in 2008, Congress created a legislative solution to a problem of its
own making in 1999.18 Further, Congress provided a fallback provision via
the de facto officer doctrine in the event that previous APJ appointments would
be deemed improper.' 86
The de facto officer doctrine's Anglo-American heritage spans more than
500 years and is a constitutionally valid tool for conferring validity on past
actions.'7 Court precedent approves of the doctrine's limited use for an
inappropriately appointed officer who was "in the unobstructed possession of
an office and discharging its duties in full view of the public, in such manner
and under such circumstances as not to present the appearance of being an
intruder or usurper." 1 The doctrine is intended to avoid the inevitable chaos
sure to ensue if actions taken by policymakers deemed inappropriately
181. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c); see John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges
Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 919-20 (2009).
182. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1194 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a de facto officer as "[a]n
officer who exercises the duties of an office under color of an appointment or election, but who
has failed to qualify for office for any one of various reasons, as by being under the required age,
having failed to take the oath, having not furnished a required bond, or having taken office under
a statute later declared unconstitutional").
183. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (per curiam) (deeming the de facto officer
doctrine an appropriate remedy to confer retroactive validity upon administrative decisions of the
Federal Election Commission); see also Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995)
(recognizing the de facto officer doctrine as a constitutionally valid legislative device to confer
"validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is
later discovered that the legality of that person's appointment or election to office is deficient").
184. Duffy, supra note 181, at 921.
185. In yet another parallel between the APJs and copyright royalty judges, the current
constitutional crisis surrounding the Board is the product of Congress's action in 2004
establishing the Board inside the Library, and authorizing the Librarian to appoint the judges.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
187. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without
Authority, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 581, 595 (2001).
188. Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302, 323 (1902).
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appointed "could later be invalidated by exposing defects in the officials'
titles."' 89
There is some doubt, however, that the de facto officer doctrine is an
appropriate cure for the Board's constitutional malady. The Supreme Court
has instructed that reviewing courts should not reflexively employ the de facto
officer doctrine, and cannot aply it "when the statute creating the office in
question is unconstitutional."' As the Court held in Norton v. Shelby County,
"[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation,
as inoperative as though it had never been passed."l91 Some therefore suggest
that the doctrine represents an inappropriate tool for conferring validity upon
prior decisions made by copyright royalty judges.' 92
Yet modem Supreme Court precedent suggests that the doctrine is
appropriate for just such occasions. In Buckley, for example, the Court
invoked the doctrine after declaring a statute providing appointment for FEC
members unconstitutional.193 Rather than strike all decisions promulgated by
dubiously appointed commissioners, the Court emphasized that inappropriate
appointment "should not affect the validity of the Commission's administrative
actions and determinations."194 Furthermore, no precedent exists for rejecting
legislative application of the doctrine to cure perceived constitutional
defects.195 Congress thus retains authority to confer validity on determinations
adjudicated by previously appointed copyright royalty judges and can look to
its 2008 modification of the administrative patent-adjudication system as a
roadmap for success.
Although the appointment structure for copyright royalty judges and the
previous appointment for APJs are not completely parallel, 96 they are similar
189. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
190. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 187, at 596 (citing Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425,440-42 (1886)).
191. Norton, 118 U.S. at442.
192. See Duffy, supra note 181, at 920 (doubting whether courts will permit reliance upon
the de facto officer doctrine to confer validity upon decisions rendered by administrative patent
judges).
193. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (per curiam).
194. Id.; cf Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 550-51 (1972) (per curiam) (refusing to
invalidate state elections even if the plan for reapportioning legislative districts violated the
Fourteenth Amendment).
195. See DBC v. Patent & Trademark Office, Bd. of Patent Appeals & Interferences, 130 S.
Ct. 59 (Oct. 5, 2009) (No. 08-1284) (denying certiorari); Brief for the Respondent in Opposition
at 19, DBC, No. 08-1284 (June 17, 2009).
196. Prior to congressional intervention, administrative patent judges owed their
appointments to the Director of the PTO, who is appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. See
supra text accompanying notes 173-74. Copyright royalty judges are instead appointed by the
Librarian, who owes his appointment to the President. 2 U.S.C. § 136 (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 801
(2006). The extra layer between the President and the PTO Director is thus absent in the
Librarian's appointment.
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enough to warrant the same protection. And given the constitutional shield
erected by Congress's amendment in 2008, it makes sense to apply a similar
anecdote to the constitutional crisis surrounding the Board.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Appointments Clause represents the separation-of-powers principles
that permeate the Constitution and prevents one branch of the government
from aggrandizing political power at the expense of the other two. The
constitutional restrictions represent the Framers' fear that appointment power,
if too diffuse, might upset the balance of power that they considered
paramount. Congress has violated these principles by vesting a legislative
officer with the power to appoint inferior executive officers. Legislation
vesting the Librarian of Congress with the power to appoint inferior copyright
royalty judges is one such instance. The Copyright Royalty Board, over which
the judges preside, stands subject to constitutional attack as a result.
Without swift legislative action by Congress, a federal court may hold that
copyright royalty judges are appointed in violation of constitutional principles.
Congress should therefore prevent judicial intervention by providing the
President direct authority to appoint copyright royalty judges independent from
the legislative branch. By taking action, Congress will provide the Board
immunity from constitutional scrutiny and will bring stability to the copyright
system that is currently shrouded in doubt.
209
Catholic University Law Review210 [Vol. 60:183
